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Values, Context and Hybridity
How can the insights from the liberal 
peace critique literature be brought to 
bear on the practices of the UN Peace-
building Architecture?
Eli Stamnes 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
The liberal peace critique literature sheds light on the values promoted 
through contemporary peacebuilding efforts and the implications of 
this. It shows that peacebuilding currently assumes the universal valid-
ity of the ‘liberal peace thesis’, and therefore involves the introduction 
of reform packages and programmes aimed at creating market econo-
mies and liberal democracies. This particular operationalisation of lib-
eral peacebuilding is to a large extent treated as indisputable and 
‘common sense’, hence excluding alternatives. Pointing out the status 
quo bias and intrusive nature of such activities, the authors argue that 
local ownership should mean taking the recipient societies’(rather than 
simply governments’ and elites’) understanding of the problems and 
solutions as the starting point of peacebuilding. Moreover, there 
should be a stronger focus on redistribution and social justice in order 
to build a sustainable peace. The literature demonstrates that current 
peacebuilding efforts favour general knowledge, standardisation and 
template use, which, doubtless unintentionally, constitutes an obstacle 
to adequately addressing the concerns and conditions of the host soci-
ety. Consequently, there is a tendency to assume that the recipients of 
peacebuilding must be taught what peacebuilding is about and what 
they need. A warning is also issued against seeing post-conflict socie-
ties as purely traditional or illiberal. Rather they should be treated as 
complex, or hybrid, societies, and peacebuilding solutions should be 
sought at the interface between external and internal normative agen-
das. 
 
In order to address the insights from the liberal peace critique litera-
ture, the Peacebuilding Architecture’s future development of Inte-
grated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS) should:  
 
 Start from broad-based and comprehensive consultations in the 
countries in question, in order to avoid privileging the views of 
governments and elites in their respective capitals as well as 
New York, and to mitigate the UN’s inherent statism.  
 
 Discard preconceptions of what peacebuilding is about, and 
rather base the IPBSs firmly in the particular context and on 
existing local agents, capacities, and conceptions of peace-
building.  
 
 Further prioritise local knowledge over general knowledge by 
strengthening the relevant sections of the Peacebuilding Sup-
port Office and refocusing (and renaming) the Working Group 
on Lessons Learned. 
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 Allow for locally-based peacebuilding strategies that are not in 
line with what is considered to be desirable values and out-
comes, nor ‘the proper way of doing things’ in New York. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Does the liberal peace critique still constitute an undiscovered mes-
sage in a bottle or does it represent the proverbial elephant in the room 
when peacebuilding practitioners go about their daily work?1 There is 
by now a vast literature ‘out there’, which seeks to uncover and de-
naturalise the values underpinning contemporary peacebuilding and 
the activities derived from these particular values. Nevertheless, the 
peacebuilding enterprise carries on as if the values promoted are in-
disputable or simply common sense. Regardless of definitional nu-
ances in terms of scope2, peacebuilding is seen as synonymous with 
activities such as the introduction of multiparty elections, security sec-
tor reform, rule of law programming, human rights promotion and the 
introduction of market-based economies.  
 
This suggests that there is a glaring gap between the insights from the 
liberal peace critique on the one hand and the actual peacebuilding 
practices on the other. Whether the explanation is that these insights 
have not yet been made available to practitioners or that they have 
been deemed irrelevant or uncomfortable, is not for me to say. The 
aim of this paper is merely to start bridging this gap, by way of dis-
cussing how some of the central tenets of this academic literature can 
be brought to bear on the practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architec-
ture (PBA).3 Intended as input into the discussions of the 2010 PBA 
review, the paper will investigate the following question: what would 
the process of developing so-called integrated peacebuilding strategies 
(IPBS) look like, if insights from the liberal peace critique were made 
                                                 
1  The notion of academic work as a message in a bottle, there to be read, understood and 
potentially brought to bear on practice, is a recurrent theme in the work of the Frankfurt 
School, see, Thomas Wheatland, The Frankfurt School in Exile (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2009), 347 regarding the initial usage by Max Horkheimer. 
2  For different definitions of peacebuilding, see, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An 
Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (New York: 
United Nations, 1992), para. 21; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil 
Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 38; Dan Smith, “Towards a 
Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of 
the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding” (Oslo: the Royal Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2004), 20; see also Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnel and 
Laura Sitea, “Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?” Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007). 
3  The PBA is the generic term used when talking about the Peacebuilding Commission, the 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). 
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endogenous to the practices of the PBA?4 The hope is that this discus-
sion can constitute a humble contribution to making the PBA’s work 
geared towards more sustainable outcomes.  
 
What is here referred to as the liberal peace critique is not a uniform 
body of literature. Its contributions are based in different meta-
theoretical traditions and vary in focus, both theoretically, empirically 
and with regard to policy-orientation. However, a common feature of 
these contributions is that they shed light on the values promoted 
through contemporary peacebuilding efforts and the consequences of 
this. In this way, they constitute what Robert W. Cox has dubbed 
critical theory, in that they stand ‘back from the existing order of 
things to question how that order came into being, how it may be 
changing, and how that change may be influenced or channelled’.5 
The term critique is thus used to denote an investigation into underly-
ing assumptions and implications, and does not necessarily imply 
criticism or rejection.  
 
This paper will proceed in three parts. First, some of the main argu-
ments of the liberal peace critique literature will be presented. This 
presentation will be structured around the headings of values, context 
and hybridity, thus reflecting three central messages of this body of 
literature. Then, current practices of developing IPBSs will be viewed 
in light of the arguments presented, before the implications for future 
IPBS development are discussed. 
 
 
 
Central tenets of the liberal peace  
critique literature  
It is not possible to do justice to this broad and varied body of litera-
ture in a paper such as this. I will therefore discuss some of its contri-
butions, focusing on three interrelated themes – themes I consider to 
be relevant for the following discussion of the PBA.  
                                                 
4  It should be noted, however, that some of the liberal peace critique authors might not 
support the development and implementation of such strategies in the first place.  
5  Robert W. Cox “The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organiza-
tion” Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 2 (1994), 101; see also, Robert W. Cox “Social 
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981), 128-129. 
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 Values 
The common denominator for the liberal peace critique literature is, as 
the name suggests, that its different contributions demonstrate that 
contemporary peacebuilding efforts are underpinned by liberal values. 
The end of the Cold War and its implicit discrediting of an alternative 
ideology, meant that the promoters of liberal values got free rains, 
which in turn put its mark on peace operations conducted by the 
United Nations and other multinational organisations. Whereas their 
previous engagement had almost without exception been limited to 
peacekeeping operations guided by the respect for the host states’ sov-
ereignty, war-torn societies now became the stage for complex opera-
tions aimed at political and economic liberalisation in the name of 
building peace.6  
 
This approach to peacebuilding is based on the assumption that such 
liberalisation will create stable and peaceful societies: by introducing 
multiparty democracy, conflicts will play out through party politics 
instead of through violent means, and the economic growth resulting 
from marketisation will put and end to conflicts that are due to poverty 
and struggle for resources. It is also believed that liberalisation will 
lead to peace at the international stage. This assumption is closely as-
sociated with the work of Michael Doyle. Drawing on Kant’s ideas of 
how to achieve perpetual peace, he demonstrates that liberal demo-
cracies do not go to war with each other. Thus, systems of global gov-
ernance should, in his opinion, aim to include more states into the 
‘Liberal Pacific Union’.7 ‘This liberal peace thesis has been critiqued 
on several grounds. One regards its assumed universality. Critics take 
issue with the fact that the promotion of what are essentially Western 
values is treated as having universal validity. In other words, these are 
values that are historically and spatially specific but are portrayed as 
being timeless and spaceless truths. Moreover, derived from these 
values are particular forms of state, economy and social structure. By 
insisting on their universality there is little room for alternative inter-
pretations.8 So, not only does this approach presume that it is possible 
to establish a set of universal ‘root causes’ to conflict, and an ever-
valid recipe to address them, it also allows for ‘the pre-representation 
                                                 
6  Paris, At Wars End; Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 2008); Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Houndmills: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005). 
7  Michel W. Doyle “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs” Philosophy in Public 
Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983) 205-235, 12, no. 4 (1983) 323-353; Michael W. Doyle, “A Lib-
eral View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Union” in International Order 
and the Future of World Politics, eds. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1999), 41-66. 
8  Cox, “The Crisis in World Order”, 103; Oliver P. Richmond “UN peace operations and 
the dilemma of the peacebuilding consensus”, International Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 
(2004), 91; Michael Pugh “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory” International Peacekeep-
ing 11, 1 (2004) , 39-58. 
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of the political interest of war-torn societies’.9 Politics and context are 
thus taken out of the equation.  
 
The universal presentation and apparently altruistic and benign moti-
vations behind these prescriptions make them very persuasive. The 
same goes for their association with the United Nations and ‘interna-
tional community’.10 ‘The inherent ‘goodness’ and desirability created 
by the rhetoric of peacebuilding serves to appease fears of Western 
hegemony’.11 Indeed, as Roger Mac Ginty argues, ‘one of the features 
of the liberal peace has been its success in convincing countries and 
communities that there is no alternative to it’.12 Liberal peacebuilding 
is not just seen as the best way to create peace and stability – it is con-
sidered to be the only way. 
 
Another ground for critique is the way in which the liberal peace the-
sis and liberal peacebuilding construct conceptions of war and peace 
as well as of the actors and recipients of peacebuilding. Underpinning 
the discourse of liberal peacebuilding is a dichotomous ontology. Bi-
naries such as liberal-non-liberal, peace-war, modern-traditional, de-
veloped-underdeveloped, civilised-barbaric are implicit or explicit in 
discussion of causes, solutions, problems and remedies.13 Moreover, 
the ‘negatives’ such as war, underdevelopment, barbarism etc are lo-
cated in the global South. The states that are objects for peacebuilding 
are thus ‘pathologised’.14 They are seen as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’, in need 
of external help in order to install the cure of liberal governance. 
Moreover, individuals or groups inside the recipient states who are 
resisting liberal reforms are often criminalised or simply considered to 
be “spoilers”.15 Alternative ways of organising society are thus seen as 
morally inferior. This in turn justifies the intervention of outsiders, the 
assumption being that they know ‘better than the people concerned 
what peace needs to be built’ and how. 16 
 
                                                 
9  Kristoffer Lidén, “Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical 
Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding”, International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009), 626. 
10  Roger Mac Ginty “Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: a challenge to the liberal peace?” 
Conflict, Security and Development 7, no. 3 (2007), 471-472. 
11  Jenny H. Peterson “‘Rule of Law’ initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politi-
cised reform in post-conflict states”, Disasters 34, no.1 (2010), s15-s39. 
12  Roger Mac Ginty “Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: a challenge to the liberal peace?” 
Conflict, Security and Development 7, no. 3 (2007), 472. 
13  Kristoffer Lidén, “Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement: A Postcolonial 
Ethic of Liberal Peacebuilding” paper presented at the International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, New York, 2009 (accessed at www.allacademic.com). He empha-
sises that the explicit use of terms such as uncivilised and barbaric are not acceptable in 
the current liberal peacebuilding discourse (p. 4).  
14  Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac “Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International 
Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States”, Third World Quarterly 26, 
no. 6 (2005), 873-889 . 
15  Stephen J. Stedman “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes” International Security 22, no. 
2 (1997), 5-53. 
16  Bruno Charbonneau “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building): France, Europe, Africa” 
paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New York, 
2009, 20. 
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Peace is thus constructed as ‘obtainable…propagated through an epi-
stemic peacebuilding community, involving political, social, eco-
nomic, and even cultural intervention through external governance’17 
By locating war in the global South and peace, and its building, in the 
hands of liberal outsiders, conceptions of war and peace are con-
structed in such a way that violence becomes an acceptable part of 
peacebuilding, but is illegitimate when it is conducted by its ‘objects’. 
Hence, illiberal practices can be justified as means towards a liberal 
peace.18 
 
Similar mechanisms also serve to justify the large-scale social engi-
neering project that liberal peacebuilding entails. Whereas Security 
Council resolutions or invitations from the host states serve to appease 
sovereignty-related worries, there is no question that this represents 
challenges to the recipient societies’ autonomy. In liberal peacebuild-
ing, peace is equated with conflict management and the construction 
of strong states through a package of reforms and programmes. These 
include inter alia security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobi-
lisation and reintegration (DDR), rule of law programming (RoL), 
human rights promotion and monitoring, electoral reforms, and meas-
ures aimed at creating a market economy. Although these elements are 
emphasised to different degrees in different context, their inclusion in 
peacebuilding has become commonsensical.19 They constitute, how-
ever, a particular interpretation of the implications of the liberal peace 
thesis, in which Western models and politico-cultural and economic 
norms underpin the solutions arrived at. Their assumed universality 
serves to cloud the possibility for alternative interpretations of the lib-
eral peace, based more solidly in the culture and conditions of the re-
cipient societies.20  
 
Other reservations to this particular interpretation and operationalisa-
tion of the liberal peace thesis include warnings that these different 
components may be incoherent and work at cross-purposes with each 
other.21 It is also argued that the implementation of the various re-
                                                 
17  Oliver P. Richmond, “The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’”, Conflict, 
Security and Development 6, no. 3 (2006), 291-314. 
18  Peterson; Lidén “Building Peace Between Global and Local Politics”; Annika Björkdahl, 
“To practice what they preach: International transitional administrations and the paradox 
of norm promotion” in Globalization and Challenges to Peacebuilding, eds. Ashok 
Swain, Ramses Amer & Joakim Öjendal (London: Anthem Press, 2007), 145-164; Simon 
Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuild-
ing Operations” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1, no. 1 (2007), 3-26. 
19  Neclâ Tschirgi, “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, 
Challenges”, IPA Policy Report (New York: International Peace Academy, 2004), 10; 
John Heathershaw, “Unpacking the liberal peace: the dividing and Merging of Peace-
building Discourses” Millennium 36, no. 3 (2008), 597-621. 
20  Mac Ginty, “Reconstructing post-war Lebanon”, 457; Oliver P. Richmond Peace in In-
ternational Relations. London: Routledge; Lidén, “Building Peace between Global and 
Local Politics”. 
21  Thomas J. Biersteker “Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission”, Disarmament 
Forum 2 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2007), 39-40; Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The 
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forms and programmes become ends in themselves rather than means 
to an end, or that the objective of implementing them as quickly as 
possible may become a primary concern overshadowing their ultimate 
objective. 22  
 
Several liberal peace critics argue that the building of liberal democra-
cies by external actors is actually counter-productive to the goals 
sought achieved through such interventions. In the words of Roger 
Mac Ginty it ‘often results in a poor quality peace in which the civil 
war has ended but intergroup antagonisms remain undimmed, political 
participation rates are low and any peace dividend is unevenly 
shared’.23 On the basis of a study of eleven peacebuilding operations 
conducted in the period of 1989-1998, Roland Paris argue that the lib-
eralization of the economic and or political sphere actually had a de-
stabilising effect rather than contributing to peace. ‘In some countries, 
liberalization exacerbated societal tensions, and in others it repro-
duced traditional sources of violence’. In his view this is because pro-
ponents of the liberal peace ‘have tended to blur the distinction be-
tween liberalism and liberalisation’ and that little is known about the 
relationship between the latter and violence.24 In an article on the po-
litical economy of peacebuilding, Michael Pugh argues that the socio-
economic problems of war-torn societies are aggravated by market 
liberalisation. This is because it increases the populations’ vulnerabil-
ity to poverty, deprive them from having a say in economic recon-
struction, and does little to reduce engagement in and reliance upon 
shadow economies.25 It is also argued that the international presence 
only contributes to a ‘negative peace’, despite its transformative inten-
tions.26 It seeks to control conflicts, not transforming them and results 
merely in the absence of war in the host societies. This is due to its 
failure to seriously address the question of what would constitute a 
just social order (‘positive peace’).27 Oliver Richmond takes issue 
with contemporary peacebuilding’s lack of focus on and engagement 
with society. By being concerned with the ‘creation of the hard shell 
of the state and rather less so on establishing a working society, com-
plete with a viable economy which has an immediately beneficial ef-
                                                 
Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations 
(London: Routledge, 2009).  
22  Peterson; Roland Paris At Wars End.; Oliver P. Richmond, “The problem of peace; 
Katarina Ammitzbøll and Stina Torjesen, “Maximum or minimum? Policy options for 
democratisation initiatives in UN Peace Operations” NUPI Report (Oslo: NUPI, May 
2007). 
23  Roger Mac Ginty “Reconstructing post-war Lebanon”, 472. 
24  Roland Paris, At War’s End, 151, 51. 
25  Michael Pugh “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 2 (2005), 25. 
26  On these intentions, see, for example Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene 
O’Donnel and Laura Sitea, 44. 
27  For the original discussion of positive and negative peace, see, Johan Galtung, “Violence, 
peace and peace research” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969), 167–191; and 
Johan Galtung “A Structural Theory of Imperialism” Journal of Peace Research 8, no. 2 
(1971), 81–117.  
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fect on the labour force or provides a welfare system’, only a virtual 
peace is established.28 This, he claims, has similarities with former 
colonial dependencies.  
 
The intrusive and ‘educational’ nature of the liberal peacebuilding en-
terprise has also made other authors compare it to imperial modes of 
governance. Paris describes it as a benign form of the mission civilisa-
trice. The internationally-sanctioned model for governance serves as a 
‘standard of civilization’ which must be adhered to in order to be fully 
accepted as a member of international community. He argues it is be-
nign in that its promotion is not conducted primarily to advance eco-
nomic interest. It also lacks the racial connotations often underpinning 
colonialism.29 Also Duffield emphasises the difference between the 
liberal peace and the imperial peace. Whereas the latter was based 
upon direct territorial control, which would include violence, the for-
mer is a non-territorial form of governance in which its objects – peo-
ple in the South – are not forced, but expected to adhere willingly.30 
David Chandler asserts that international actors’ peacebuilding and 
statebuilding activities constitutes an ‘empire in denial’, in which the 
inherent power in such activities works under the guise of terms such 
as ‘ownership’, ‘assistance’ and ‘facilitation’.31 Similarly, Bruno 
Charbonneau argues that peacebuilding is a hegemonic practice pri-
marily aimed at governing and manage, not helping, its recipients.32  
 
A related critique regards this peacebuilding model’s effect on world 
order. Several of the authors contributing to this body of literature 
point out liberal peacebuilding’s status quo bias. It is argued that the 
emphasis on the liberalisation of the economy and the construction of 
liberal democracies and stable states, contributes to the smooth func-
tioning of the current world order, thereby maintaining its particular 
distribution of power and wealth.33 By prioritising the state as the 
frame for intervention, liberal peacebuilding contributes to maintain-
ing the existing system of states, thus serving the interests of those 
benefiting from it and ignoring those who are marginalised or threat-
ened by its very existence. In connection to the Balkan wars Susan 
Woodward argues that international involvement has consisted of ‘a 
                                                 
28  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 309 see also, Béatrice Pouligny, “Civil Society and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 
“New” Societies”, Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005), 505; Oliver P. Richmond ”UN 
peace operations and the dilemma of the peacebuilding consensus”. 
29  Roland Paris “International Peacebuilding and the ’Mission Civilisatrice’”, Review of 
International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002), 637-656.  
30  Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001), 34. 
31  David Chandler Empire in Denial (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 
32  Bruno Charbonneau, “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 1-2; see also his 
“Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa”, Modern 
and Contemporary France 16, no. 3, 279-295.  
33  On this see, for example, Eli Stamnes, United Nations Preventive Deployment in Mace-
donia: A Critical Security Studies Analysis, PhD Thesis, University of Wales Aberyst-
wyth (2002); Pugh, “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory”; Richmond, “UN Peace Opera-
tions and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus”. 
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policy of containment . . . aimed at protecting … prosperous democra-
cies against the effects of the region’s instability’.34 This kind of ‘riot 
control’35 has been conducted by the use of both coercion and re-
wards.36 In the case of the Balkans, aspirations of EU and NATO 
membership have made the latter very tangible. Focusing on France-
Europe-Africa security relations, Charbonneau states that ‘the promo-
tion of peace and security in Africa has meant the stability of modes 
of governance that benefit specific governing elites, and that uphold 
and/or defend a kind of economic development more favorable to 
France and Europe’.37 With particular reference to the economic 
sphere, similar arguments are made by Pugh: 
 
The means for achieving the good life are constructions that emerge from the 
discourse and policy frameworks dominated by specific capitalist interests – 
represented as shared, inevitable, commonsensical or the only available op-
tion – when they correspond to the prevailing mode of ownership. Economic 
wisdom resides with the powerful’.38 
 
So, despite the transformative intention of liberal peacebuilding, it has 
in this way conservative consequences. And, by portraying the crea-
tion of liberal regimes as inevitable if peace is to be built, these conse-
quences are camouflaged. This is not to say that Western peacebuild-
ing actors are consciously – or hypocritically, as Mark Duffield ar-
gues39 – working to maintain the status quo, thus acting purely in their 
own self-interest. Such is the commonsensical nature of the liberal 
peace thesis that their motivations may indeed be progressive and al-
truistic.40 The structural effects are nevertheless the same.  
Context  
Another main theme in this body of literature is the failure of liberal 
peacebuilding practices to adequately address the different local con-
texts in which they take place. Even though the importance of ‘local 
ownership’ is emphasised in documents and oral communication con-
nected to contemporary peacebuilding efforts, there is widespread 
agreement that this is one of the areas most in need of improvement.41 
                                                 
34  Susan L. Woodward “In Whose Interest is Security Sector Reform?” in Governing Inse-
curity: Democratic Control of Military Security Establishments in Transitional Democra-
cies, eds. G. Cawthra and R. Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003), 279. 
35  Pugh, “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory”, 41.  
36  On this, see, for example Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 106; Duffield, 34. 
37  Charbonneau, “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 19. 
38  Pugh, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, 38. 
39  Duffield, 12; see also Peterson: ‘international actors have been effective in masking their 
political project’. 
40  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 310; Cf. Jarat Chopra Peace-Maintenance: The Evo-
lution of International Political Authority (London: Routledge, 1999); for a discussion of 
the Nordic countries’ various motivations for participation in peace operations, see, Eli 
Stamnes, ed., Peace Support Operations: Nordic Perspectives (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
41  See, for example, Cedric de Coning in this volume; Ole Jacob Sending “Why Peacebuild-
ers Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context”, NUPI Working Paper 755 
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Whereas proponents and critics of the liberal peace seem to agree 
there, the latter demonstrate that there are important differences in 
conception of local ownership between the two. Liberal peacebuilders, 
such as the UN, tend to view ownership as a means to ‘reinforce the 
perceived legitimacy of the peaceoperation and support mandate im-
plementation’ for thus to ‘avoid the appearance of paternalism or neo-
colonialism’ 42 Efforts to achieve local ownership in connection to 
such operations focus in this way on creating local support for the al-
ready defined mandate of the operations. Local ownership is thus not 
seen ‘as an ultimate goal or vision … but as a practical strategy for 
action’.43 What is to be owned is, in other words, an externally defined 
agenda.44 That agenda includes certain methodologies, objectives and 
norms. For the critics of liberal peacebuilding, on the other hand, local 
ownership means building peace from the bottom up, basing strategies 
on goals and activities defined by a broad constituency in the host  
society.45 In this way it should be associated with experienced, not 
idealized versions of peace.46  
 
The assumed universality of the liberal peace thesis and its derived 
peacebuilding measures constitutes an obstacle to taking local condi-
tions and resources into account, and for understanding the particular 
problems of the societies in question. Since the problem is pre-defined 
as a lack of liberal institutions etc., local preferences, culture and prac-
tices are devalued, often seen as part of the problem, and knowledge 
about these factors is considered to be relevant insofar as it will help 
implementing the liberal peacebuilding model.47 The universality as-
sumption means that the gathering of ‘lessons learned’ from previous 
engagements are seen as a useful way to better fine-tune future peace-
building practices. This in turn, serves to reaffirm liberal peacebuild-
ing’s ‘significance for everyone, everywhere’. The fine-tuning is 
therefore merely a repackaging of hegemonic practices.48 This reso-
nates with what Cox has dubbed ‘problem-solving’ theory. This ‘takes 
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relation-
ships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given 
framework for action’. Its aim is to make the current system function 
                                                 
(Oslo: NUPI, 2009); Oliver Richmond “The problem of peace”, 300-306; Tschirgi. 
42  United Nations “United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines” the so-called 
Capstone Doctrine, (New York: United Nations, 2008), 39; Chesterman, 9.  
43  Hannah Reich ““Local Ownership” in conflict transformation projects: Partnership, Par-
ticipation or Patronage?”, Berghof Occasional Paper No. 27 (Berlin: Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006).  
44  Lidén “Building Peace between Global and Local Politics”, 626. 
45  Richmond “The problem of peace”, 300; Chandler, Empire in Denial. 
46  Roger Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and 
Peace Accords (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 102. 
47  Duffield; Charles Call and Elisabeth Cousens “Ending Wars and Building Peace: Interna-
tional Responses to War-Torn Societies” International Studies Perspective 9, no.1 (2008), 
1-21.; Peterson; Woodward. 
48  Charbonnea, .8; Stamnes, “United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia”, 78. 
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as smoothly as possible. 49 The failure of taking the local context into 
account can thus be seen to have consequences beyond the concern for 
the legitimacy and efficiency of particular peacebuilding operations.  
 
There are also organizational reasons for downplaying the importance 
of context-specific knowledge. Due to the relatively fast rotation of 
personnel and limited bureaucratic and financial resources, there is a 
tendency towards standardization and the generation and use of tem-
plates. As a result, similarities are sought out and emphasized at the 
expense of context awareness.50 ‘For many intervening parties Bosnia 
becomes Bougainville and the same policy prescriptions (good gov-
ernance, marketisation, elections, security sector reform, etc.) are in-
troduced regardless of context and local need’.51 Moreover, contempo-
rary management models with their emphasis on measuring output, 
outcomes, and impact leave little room for uniqueness and favour 
standardisation. They also tend to be self-referential, as achievements 
are measured according to their own standards.52 Peacebuilding is thus 
in danger of becoming formulaic and a ‘technocratic exercise of tick-
ing boxes’53 
 
The implications of the critiques presented above are manifold, and 
different solutions are suggested by different contributors. These 
range from the withdrawal from peacebuilding activities via limiting 
international involvement to ‘security keeping’, to revising or fine-
tuning the liberal model.54 The following section will take a closer 
look at some other suggested solutions. By utilising ideas from post-
colonial theory and critical International Relations theory these au-
thors seek to reconceptualise liberal peacekeeping while addressing 
concerns of the critique presented above.55  
Hybridity  
Authors such as Charbonneau and Kristoffer Lidén seek to nuance the 
claims that liberal peacebuilding simply imposes liberal values in the 
recipient societies. Drawing on post-colonial theory, they argue that 
values imposed by external actors are received, interpreted, chal-
                                                 
49  Cox “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, 128. On UN peace operations and prob-
lemsolving, see, Stamnes, “United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia”. 
50  Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore Rules for the World (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2004); Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after 
War” International Security 30, no. 4, (2006), 87-112; Tschirgi, 16. 
51  Mac Ginty “Reconstructing post-war Lebanon”, 458. 
52  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 309. 
53  Roger Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace, 3; Heathershaw. 
54  David Chandler “Back to the future: the limits of neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting de-
mocracy” Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006), 475-494; Kimberly Zisk Mar-
ten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2004); Barnett “Building a Republican Peace”; Paris, At Wars End. 
55  For a thorough discussion of the reconceptualisation of liberal peacebuilding, see, Roland 
Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”, Review of International Studies, forthcoming. 
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lenged, and resisted in a variety of ways. In other words, it is not just a 
one-way street. 56 Their starting point is thus that 
  
peacebuilding cannot be fully understood … if we do not recognize the 
complex dynamics between the peacebuilders and its recipients specifically, 
and between the “exporters” of peace situated in the global North and the 
“importers” of peace located in the global South generally.57 
 
Post-colonial theory provides good insight into the challenges facing 
liberal peacebuilding because it shows that the relations between 
colonisers and colonised were complex. It was not just a relationship 
reducible to violence, although this played a significant role.58 Neither 
was it a relationship in which influence and material gains moved in 
only one direction. The relationship between liberal peacebuilders and 
its recipients can, according to these authors, be seen in the same light. 
Although peacebuilding may be described as a hegemonic practice, 
influence and ‘assistance’ can work both ways. For example, the re-
cipients may enable peacebuilding actors to build their image as sig-
nificant actors.59 It is thus an asymmetric relationship that transforms 
both.  
 
Moreover, post-colonial theory helps deconstruct the binaries under-
pinning liberal peacebuilding, such as liberal-non-liberal, peace-war, 
developed-underdeveloped, civilised-barbarian.60 It points out that 
post-colonial societies cannot be described as pre-modern, but hybrid 
societies, which have experienced and adapted to outside intervention. 
The post-colonial condition is ‘an irreversible state of hybridity’.61 
Since contemporary peacebuilding to a large extent takes place in 
post-colonial societies, it is not simply the case that external actors 
impose modern or liberal values on to traditional and non-liberal so-
cieties.  
 
Peacebuilding practices based on these insights would, it is argued, 
involve awareness that measures aimed at liberalisation would cause 
reactions of acceptance, adaptation and resistance simultaneously. 
                                                 
56  Lidén, ”Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 7; Charbonneau, “The 
Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 12. 
57  Charbonneau, “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 12. 
58  For more on post-colonial theory, see, for example, Phillip Darby, “Pursuing the Political: 
A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International”, Millennium 33, no.1, 1-32; Robert 
Young, Post-colonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2001); Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 
1978); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the In-
terpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988). 
59  Charbonneau, “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 18; see also, Ståle Ulriksen, 
“Deployments for Development? Nordic Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa”, International 
Peacekeeping 14, no. 4, 553-568. 
60  Lidén, “Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 3-4.; Charbonneau, “The 
Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 11. 
61  Lidén, “Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 10. 
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‘The interaction and dynamics between international peacebuilders 
and national recipients, “spoilers”, combatants, and non-combatants’ 
would thus constitute possibilities for change.62 It is from these possi-
bilities a hybrid, non-hegemonic form of peace can be built. Hence, 
external involvement is not excluded, but their actions would be 
guided by the ‘affected parties’ conceptions of the substantial meaning 
of peacebuilding’, the political objective being ‘to create spaces for 
peaceful self-governance at all levels of society’.63 
 
By focusing on the interplay between international and local norma-
tive agendas and practices, the assumption that ‘one size fits all’ is left 
behind. At the same time it allows for local interpretations of the lib-
eral peace. This may well consist of some of the main ingredients of 
contemporary peacebuilding, but it will be ‘better rooted in the social 
conditions and political processes of the host-countries’.64  
 
The same emphasis on local interpretations of peace can be found in 
Oliver Richmond’s emancipatory model of peacebuilding.65 This is 
not presented as an alternative to the liberal peace project, but rather 
as a gradation of it. It is not a model that has an empirical equivalent. 
Rather it exists as an expressed aspiration by certain peacebuilding 
actors, as well as in critical International Relations literature. It is 
characterised by a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, mainly in-
volving private actors and social movements. Compared to contempo-
rary practices of peacebuilding, it is more needs based in focus and 
emphasises social welfare and justice to a much larger extent.  
 
Richmond argues that the liberalisation processes of current peace-
building have created weak states and institutions, with a resulting 
lack of confidence in the new polity, the economy and the external 
actors involved in the peacebuilding efforts. Their preoccupation with 
the reconstruction of the state ‘raises serious questions about the sus-
tainability of the peace that is being created.’66 Hence, if the building 
of a sustainable peace is the main objective, there must be a stronger 
focus on redistribution and social welfare. A stronger grounding in the 
host society is also envisaged achieved by broad consultations as to 
the meaning of peace and the concrete contents of peacebuilding. The 
emphasis on peace as opposed to conflict is an important point here. 
In contemporary peacebuilding, conceptions of threats play a central 
role – threats that are identified against the liberal peace project. By 
focusing on concrete understandings of peace, the universalism of lib-
                                                 
62  Charbonneau, “The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building)”, 20. 
63  Lidén, “Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 11-12. 
64  Lidén, “Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 2. 
65  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 300-311. 
66  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 306. 
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eral peace and its resulting justification for coercive intervention is 
avoided.  
 
Discursive practices and negotiations are central to this peacebuilding 
model.67 Conditionality, which will always be a factor when external 
actors are involved in peacebuilding, is to be subjected to bottom-up 
negotiations. Moreover, the conditionality is expected to work both 
ways, in that the local actors will hold the external actors accountable 
for observing the terms of the conditionality. The interchange between 
local actors and the internationals is in this way seen as an integral 
part of the whole peacebuilding process. This even includes the deci-
sion to withdraw external assistance. There can be no exit until both 
locals and internationals have agreed that a sustainable peace has ac-
tually been achieved.68  
 
In conclusion, these suggestions do not imply that post-conflict socie-
ties are to be left alone. Recognising that peacebuilding is an expres-
sion of ‘external concern and responsibility’,69 they argue for an en-
gagement that is more on the terms of the recipients. They emphasise 
that post-conflict societies are complex, so also is the relationship be-
tween the external and internal actors. The case is thus made for inter-
ventions that do not arrive with preconceptions of what is best for the 
people concerned, neither in terms of contents, operationalisation or 
process. Instead they should entail broad consultations around the 
question of what peace would mean in the particular setting, and focus 
on building on immanent possibilities for change in the host societies.  
 
 
 
Current IPBS development 
As a relatively new addition to the United Nations landscape, the PBA 
face many challenges and its conduct may be scrutinised from many 
angles. This section will discuss one aspect of the PBA’s current prac-
tices from the perspective of the liberal peace critique presented 
above, namely the development of IPBSs in the two initial countries 
on the PBC’s agenda, Burundi and Sierra Leone. The development of 
such ‘integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recov-
ery’ is listed as a main objective in the PBC’s founding Security 
Council and General Assembly resolutions.70 This work is conducted 
in the country-specific configurations of the PBC, with the assistance 
                                                 
67  On this, see also Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace”. 
68  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 304. 
69  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 300. 
70  A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005. 
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of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). In general terms IPBSs 
are supposed to set out the commitments of a host government and the 
international community, with the ambitious goal to build ‘inclusive 
national capacities to tackle the root causes of conflict that impede 
sustainable peace.’71 Seen from a liberal peace critique perspective, 
this goal formulation poses as many questions as it answers. Let us 
now try to unpack some of them in the context of IPBS development 
processes in Burundi and Sierra Leone. 
Values 
Thomas J. Biersteker states that the ‘theoretical underpinnings of the 
Peacebuilding Commission are profoundly liberal, although they are 
not explicitly articulated as such’.72 The Secretary-General’s address 
at the PBC’s inaugural session seems to confirm this assertion. With-
out outright acknowledging the Commission’s liberal underpinnings, 
he stated that a ‘core task is to build effective public institutions, 
within constitutional frameworks and the rule of law’.73 This reverber-
ates with the particular operationalisation of the liberal peace thesis 
that we saw has underpinned the recent years’ peacebuilding efforts. 
The PBC was thus – in Kofi Annan’s mind at least – envisaged to con-
tribute to liberal peacebuilding.  
 
The IPBSs for the first two PBC cases fit this image. The Strategic 
Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, finalised in June 2007,74 
lists the following priority areas: Promotion of good governance; 
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Bu-
rundi and PALIPEHUTU-FNL; Security sector; Justice, promotion of 
human rights and action to combat impunity; The land issue and 
socio-economic recovery; Mobilisation and coordination of interna-
tional assistance; Subregional dimension; Gender dimension. And the 
Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, finalised in De-
cember 2007,75 sets out the following priorities: Youth employment 
and empowerment; Justice and security sector reform; Consolidation 
of democracy and good governance; Capacity-building; Energy sec-
tor; Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding. Although some of these 
priorities are specific to the particular cases, a majority of them con-
tains the buzzwords of contemporary liberal peacebuilding.  
 
                                                 
71  UN Peacebuilding Support Office, “Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic 
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72  Biersteker, 39. 
73  “Opening first session of Peacebuilding Commission, Secretary-General Stresses impor-
tance of national ownership, building effective public institutions”, UN Document 
SG/SM10533 PBC/2, 23 June 2006. 
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It is also interesting to note the similarities of the IPBSs in both Bu-
rundi and Sierra Leone with the countries’ respective Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers (PRSP). Given the coordination mandate of the 
PBC, this, of course, makes perfect sense. In Sierra Leone’s case the 
overlap is an explicit intention: ‘the need to build on existing 
achievements, strategies and commitments for peace and development 
and to continue their implementation’ is stressed in the framework’s 
Principles of Cooperation.76 Nevertheless, what is interesting for this 
discussion is that the PRSPs of the Bretton Woods institutions have 
been described as ‘an exceptionally useful tool for the promotion of 
the liberal project’.77  
 
The formulation of an IPBS is highly political. By providing an 
‘analysis of priorities, challenges and risks for peacebuilding’,78 it 
passes judgement on what is important in the society in question and 
what peacebuilding should entail. The IPBSs of Burundi and Sierra 
Leone reflect understandings in line with the liberal peacebuilding 
model, and as we saw in the first section, this can be critiqued from 
several angles.  
Context 
In connection to local ownership, the Secretary-General expressed 
good intentions in his speech at the opening session of the PBC. He 
emphasised that ‘Peacebuilding requires national ownership, and must 
be home-grown’.79 In the context of the PBC, local ownership cannot 
be conceptualised the way it is in connection to peace operations, as 
discussed above. Since the PBC is not an operational body, but works 
at the strategic level, there is no operational mandate as such to ‘sell’ 
to the host society. So instead of creating local support for an exter-
nally defined agenda, the aim of the IPBS development process is to 
formulate one. However, this does not necessarily mean that the con-
ception of local ownership that is underpinning the work of the PBC is 
identical to that promoted by the liberal peace critique authors. The 
founding resolutions of the PBC affirms:  
 
the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and au-
thorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into con-
                                                 
76  For more on this see, Action Aid, Cafod and Care, “Consolidating the Peace: Views from 
Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission” (London: 
Care International UK, 2007), 12. 
77  Alastair Fraser “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls the Shots?” Review 
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78  In the case of Sierra Leone, and ‘Objectives, analysis of major challenges and identifica-
tion of risks’ in the case of Burundi. 
79  “Opening first session of Peacebuilding Commission, Secretary-General Stresses impor-
tance of national ownership, building effective public institutions”, UN Document 
SG/SM10533 PBC/2, 23 June 2006. 
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flict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies 
for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership.80 
 
In other words, local ownership is placed in the hands of the govern-
ment of the countries on the PBC agenda. It is also important to note 
that the notion of ownership expressed here entails responsibility. A 
current buzzword in peacebuilding is ‘mutual accountability’ between 
the recipient and the international community.81 However, there are 
limits to how accountable an advisory body like the PBC can be. The 
Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for 
Peacebuilding in Burundi82, for example, confirms this. Here, much 
more substantial responsibility rests on the government than on the 
international community.  
 
Both the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi and the 
Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework emphasise that 
their development has been based upon the principles of national 
ownership and partnership between the countries and the international 
actors.83 In practice this meant that the texts of the IPBSs were drafted 
in the capitals, giving the host governments a central role in develop-
ing the contents of the IPBSs. However, the texts were then negoti-
ated, almost word-by-word, in New York, and were thus affected by 
the usual intergovernmental dynamics of the UN. This of course may 
be seen to constitute a limitation to national ownership. In addition, 
one should not forget the asymmetric power relationship between the 
donor states that are members of the PBC and Burundi and Sierra 
Leone. A major motivation for inviting the international community to 
take part in discussions of their internal affairs is arguably the expec-
tation that this will lead to financial benefits.84 This was very clear 
during the inaugural meetings of the country-specific configurations, 
which ‘was perceived as equating to a pledging conference’.85 One 
could therefore wonder to what extent the Burundi and Sierra Leone 
governments were implicitly ‘disciplined’ to take part in the liberal 
peace project?86 
 
Given the intergovernmental character of the PBC, much emphasis is 
put on the ownership of the countries’ governments. But are there 
other local actor that count as ‘relevant actors’ in addition to the gov-
ernment and the different international peacebuilding actors? The 
PBC’s founding resolutions ‘Notes the importance of participation of 
regional and local actors’ and ‘Encourages the Commission to consult 
                                                 
80  A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005. 
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82  PBC/2/BDI/4, 27 November 2007. 
83  PBC/1/BDI/4, 22 June 2007, para 4a; PBC/2/SLE/1, 3 December 2007, para 1a. 
84  See, Action Aid, Cafod and Care, 25. 
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practice”, Disarmament Forum 2 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2007), 10. 
86  Richmond, The Transformation of Peace. 
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with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including 
women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuild-
ing activities, as appropriate.87 This opens up for the participation of 
regional and local actors, but the ‘as appropriate’ condition implies 
that they are not seen as central actors. 
 
In light of the arguments presented in the first section, the participa-
tion of local civil society is of particular interest here. Initially, such 
participation in PBC meetings in New York took place as a result of 
the successful lobby efforts from the Global Partnership for the Pre-
vention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), the World Federalist Move-
ment-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) and like-minded mem-
bers of the Commission.88 Provisional guidelines for the participation 
of civil society were then agreed upon in June 2007. These guidelines 
established that civil society representatives actively involved in 
peacebuilding may be invited to make oral statements or provide in-
formation in the formal meetings of the Organisational Committee and 
the country-specific configurations, if there is a perceived need and a 
consensus for this among the members.89 Civil society representatives 
may also interact and provide input in the informal country-specific 
meetings. In addition there may be held public meetings for civil soci-
ety actors prior to and after the formal meetings of the country-
specific meetings, to exchange views and disperse information.90 Civil 
society actors may also provide written statements, which the coordi-
nator of the country-specific configuration and the PBSO will ‘make 
every effort to ensure’ are ‘made available to the members of the re-
spective country-specific configuration.’91 
 
In the context of the development of the IPBSs in Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, this has meant that representatives of civil society have been 
able to make their views heard in PBC meetings in New York. In ad-
dition civil society organisations have engaged in national consulta-
tions on the peacebuilding process and frameworks in both countries, 
bringing together a host of civil society actors, government officials 
and international actors in-country.92 In this way they have been able 
to raise awareness of the PBC’s role in the countries, while at the 
same time creating fora for the articulation of civil society perspec-
tives on the peacebuilding processes in the two countries. Civil society 
organisations have hence been enabled to give ‘timely and informed 
                                                 
87  A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005, paras 19, 21. 
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92  For more on these consultations, see Action Aid, Cafod and Care; Heemskerk. 
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recommendations to the Commission’.93 These consultations are be-
lieved to have had a real impact on the contents of the IPBSs, as well 
as having contributed to national dialogues and wider ownership of 
the peacebuilding process.94 In this context it is important to note that 
the civil society consultations did not take place on the initiative of the 
PBC, but of the civil society actors them selves and, partly, the gov-
ernments.  
 
With regard to the claim that liberal peacekeeping prioritises general 
knowledge, standardisation and template use at the expense of local 
knowledge, the Secretary-General’s opening speech reflected a degree 
of self-reflexivity: ‘We must also remember that peacebuilding is in-
herently political. At times, the international community has ap-
proached peacebuilding as a largely technical exercise, involving 
knowledge and resources. The international community must not only 
understand local power dynamics, but also recognise the it is itself a 
political actor entering a political environment’.95 However, the reso-
lutions establishing the PBC clearly prioritise this kind of knowledge, 
when stating that one of its main purposes is ‘to develop best prac-
tices’.96 This work is to be conducted partly by the PBSO by ‘gather-
ing and analysing information relating to … best practices with re-
spect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues’97 and partly by the PBC’s 
Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL). The latter systematises 
insights from past peacebuilding experiences and seek to raise aware-
ness among its members, other member states and UN registered or-
ganisations. According to Christian Büger ‘it has been used as a tool 
for identifying and deliberating knowledge that should inform the 
peacebuilding approach of the PBC’. He also cites PBSO staff de-
scribing the WGLL’s role as ‘training the diplomats’.98 Underlying 
such statements is an assumption of the existence of universally appli-
cable peacebuilding knowledge. However, Büger also identify groups 
of individuals within the PBC and PBSO who reject such a universal-
ity assumption.99 
 
The accompanying assumption of a need to educate the recipients of 
peacebuilding can also be found during the IPBS development pro-
cess. The description of the situation and peacebuilding challenges in 
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the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi seemed to stem 
from a local understanding of the issues since it was built upon points 
made by the Burundi government at the first country-specific meet-
ing.100 However, preceding this presentation was a trip to Burundi 
conducted by PBSO staff, during which individuals connected to the 
government had been told which issues constituted peacebuilding is-
sues and which did not.101 Similar attitudes could also be observed 
throughout the drafting period of the Strategic Framework, in that 
PBSO staff expressed opinions about the appropriate design of a strat-
egy and concerns that the Burundian version fell short of this.102 It is 
important to note here that this is not a criticism of the staff of the 
PBSO. Their mandate is to serve as a knowledge base for peacebuild-
ing and to offer advice and secretarial services.103 In other words, they 
were just doing their job. The point is rather to point out that these are 
examples of the prioritisation of general, assumed universal peace-
building knowledge at the expense of local understandings as well as 
illustrations of the technocratic character of the peacebuilding enter-
prise.  
 
An example that demonstrates the tension between the assumption of 
universally applicable peacebuilding measures and the need to take 
the local context into account, took place during the Sierra Leone 
IPBS development process. During the energy crisis in Sierra Leone 
in 2007, the government argued for the need to include the energy sec-
tor in Sierra Leone’s IPBS. Since it was seen as rather controversial to 
include something that was ‘normally considered a medium-long-term 
development concern’ in a peacebuilding strategy, an informal the-
matic discussion within the country-specific configuration was dedi-
cated to this issue.104 The meeting concluded, however, that it could 
be included as an overarching priority issue, and the IPBS was com-
pleted the following month.105  
Hybridity 
The example of the inclusion of the energy sector in Sierra Leone’s 
IPBS may hint to the interplay between international and local norma-
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tive agendas, which the liberal peace critique authors argue should be 
central to a conceptualisation of peacebuilding. Moreover, the fact that 
Sierra Leone’s IPBS is based upon already existing strategies and 
commitments, such as Sierra Leone Vision 2025, the Sierra Leone 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Peace Consolidation Strategy, 
the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact and the report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, emphasises the point 
drawn from post-colonial theory that peacebuilding often take place in 
societies that have already received and adopted to foreign interven-
tions of various kinds.106 However, it is doubtful that the authors pre-
sented in the first section would describe the framework as a hybrid, 
non-hegemonic peacebuilding strategy, or its political objective as 
creating ‘spaces for peaceful self-governance at all levels of soci-
ety’.107 
 
The two IPBSs focus to a certain extent on social welfare and justice 
issues as advocated by Richmond and others. The economic argument 
underpinning the inclusion of the energy sector in Sierra Leone’s is 
one example. So also is its inclusion of youth employment and em-
powerment, which can be seen as a redistribution issue. The prioritisa-
tion of the land issue and socio-economic recovery in Burundi’s IPBS 
can also be said to reflect social welfare and justice concerns. Like-
wise, the inclusion of the gender dimension as a separate priority area 
there, demonstrates the intention of redistributing power and making 
women’s social welfare a public – and no longer private – matter.  
 
Although the development of the two IPBSs involved a degree of con-
sultation with civil society actors, the processes cannot be said consti-
tute a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. Nor did they mainly in-
volve private actors and social movements. National governments, 
both in the PBC and in Burundi and Sierra Leone, were the main ac-
tors when developing the strategies, although they cooperated and 
consulted with other international and national actors. By UN staff’s 
own admission, the civil society consultations conducted in the coun-
tries were insufficient.108 Several obstacles to participation have been 
identified in both Burundi and Sierra Leone, such as poor information 
flows, lack of adequate preparation time, language barriers and lack of 
financial and logistical resources. The latter were particularly impor-
tant in limiting civil society organisations in taking part in meetings in 
New York.109 It has also been pointed out that there was an overrepre-
sentation of Western-style, capital-based NGOs. Whereas these are 
more skilled in communicating with the international actors, and fit 
                                                 
106  PBC/2/SLE/1, 3 December 2007, para 3; see also Center on International Cooperation 
and International Peace Institute, 15.  
107  Lidén,“Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement”, 11. 
108  Interview with UN official, 18 February 2009. 
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the participation requirements set out in the provisional guidelines for 
participation110 better, they did not represent the rural grass root com-
munities most affected by conflict. This meant that rural people’s con-
ception of problems and solutions were not taken into account while at 
the same time they also lost out on information about the PBC and the 
development of the IPBSs.111 
 
To sum up the arguments made in this section, one could say that the 
practices of the PBC in connection to developing the IPBSs for Bu-
rundi and Sierra Leone fit well into Richmond’s orthodox model of 
the liberal peace. Here ‘actors are wary and sensitive about local own-
ership and culture, but still also determined to transfer their methodo-
logies, objectives and norms into the new governance framework 
…This equates to a balanced and multilateral, and still state-centric 
peace’.112 
 
 
 
Future IPBS development --  
implications of the liberal peace  
critique 
Let us now turn to the implications that the insights from the liberal 
peace critique may have for the PBC’s practices of developing IPBSs 
in the future. This discussion will first be structured around the same 
headings – values, context, hybridity. Then, some of the main points 
will be summarised in the form of critical questions to be posed during 
the current configuration of the IPBS process.  
Values  
One of the messages from the liberal peace critique literature pre-
sented under this heading is that contemporary peacebuilding is based 
on the assumption of the universal validity of the liberal peace thesis. 
This entails an acceptance of the proposition that the creation of lib-
eral market democracies is the best, and indeed, only way of achieving 
stable, peaceful states. Moreover, the universality assumption also in-
cludes the tools derived from the liberal peace thesis, making the im-
plementation of these particular reforms and programmes appear as 
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common sense and thus excluding the possibility of alternative opera-
tionalisations.  
 
So, how can these insights be brought to bear on the PBC’s work of 
developing IPBSs? Essentially it means that there is a need for in-
creasing the self-reflexivity of all the parties involved in the PBC’s 
different configurations with regard to the values underpinning their 
discourses and activities. It does not necessarily mean a rejection of 
the current liberal peacebuilding model, but it entails an awareness of 
the fact that it is actually a chosen approach, not just common sense or 
a necessity. Especially, there should be increased awareness of the ef-
fects of assuming its universality, with regard to approaching situa-
tions with a pre-defined understanding of what the problems are and 
how to approach them. This is not to say that actors involved are con-
scious of these dynamics, or approach the issue with arrogance. It is 
rather to point out that their frames of reference when discussing 
peacebuilding are coloured by liberal understandings of conflict, war 
and threats, for example when identifying key concerns in the recipi-
ent countries. Hence, there might be an element of ‘we know what is 
best for them’ even in the best-intentioned practices. I will propose 
that such awareness-raising become part of the agenda of the Working 
Group on Lessons Learned and the PBSO. 
 
Another message from the liberal peace critique literature is that con-
temporary peacebuilding contains a status quo bias. The privileging of 
a market economy and the maintenance of the stability of the current 
system of states means that it serves the interests of those benefiting 
from this particular world order. The involvement in the PBC of the 
World Bank and other donors favouring this particular economic sys-
tem seems to suggest that this may be hard to do something about. A 
mitigating factor, though, is the strong representation of developing 
countries in the PBC. This may mean a stronger presence of alterna-
tive perspectives than what is the case with other peacebuilding initia-
tives. Nevertheless, self-reflexivity is of essence also in this context.  
 
Given that the UN is made up of member states, does that mean that 
the Organisation is too much ‘the servant of the present state system, 
responsive to the existing configuration of power’ or can the PBC be-
come one of the ‘interlocutors for the new forces that, in the long run, 
can change forms of states and the very nature of the state system?’113 
It is in my opinion too early to say, but the PBC can seek to mitigate 
the inherent statism by choosing to relate to other actors in the host 
countries in addition to their governments. In order to address this 
concern, it is crucial that the PBC allow for widespread consultations 
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with civil society when developing IPBSs. Here, it is important to 
keep in mind Béatrice Pouligny’s reminder regarding the large diver-
sity in local civil society.114 Another relevant question in this context 
is how to deal with minority-related conflicts when one of the key 
partners in the PBC is the host government. These are sensitive issues 
that can easily taint or destroy good working relationships, and the 
concern for this can constitute an obstacle to dealing with issues that 
are central to the society in question. This is a topic for further explo-
ration both in connection to the PBC’s work on IPBS development 
and for UN peace operations more generally.115  
Context 
The discussion of the liberal peace critique literature underlined the 
importance of local ownership in peacebuilding, and the need to 
reconceptualise it. Local ownership, it was argued, should not just be 
an efficiency concern and be taken to mean how to secure local sup-
port for externally defined mandates. Rather it should mean taking the 
recipient countries’ understanding of the problems and visions of solu-
tions, as the starting point of peacebuilding initiatives. In the context 
of developing IPBSs, this would have wide-reaching implications for 
the PBC’s modus operandi as well as resources and time spent on 
these processes. In line with what was argued above, the development 
of the IPBSs should be based on much broader consultations in the 
host society. It would mean a rejection of the assumption that gov-
ernments, by virtue of being representatives of the states’ citizens, 
have a privileged position in IPBS development. For a solid grounding 
of the peacebuilding efforts in the host society, people with a variety 
of experiences must be allowed to have a say, not only the political 
elites and a few chosen representatives of civil society. This does not 
just mean that it will be a more time consuming process. It would also 
mean increased costs for organising consultations, translating docu-
ments and oral presentations, and other ways of facilitating participa-
tion. Perhaps enabling different segments of society to have a say 
would prove such an immense task that it would become the Commis-
sion’s primary role? 
 
The tendency to privilege general knowledge, standardisation and 
template use, is also seen as and obstacle to adequately address the 
concerns and conditions of the society in which peacebuilding take 
place. This also means a preoccupation with the gathering of ‘lessons 
learned’, which in turn serves to reinforce this tendency. Moreover, 
the resulting prioritisation of generic peacebuilding expertise over lo-
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cal knowledge means that there is a tendency to assume that the re-
cipients of peacebuilding must be taught what peacebuilding is about, 
and hence what they need. If the PBC were to take these insights seri-
ously, it would mean letting the countries in question set their own 
agenda, without offering any advise on what are relevant peacebuild-
ing issues. It would also mean privileging a different kind of know-
ledge. For the PBC and the PBSO, the focus should not be on lessons 
learned with the purpose of drawing-out general knowledge, applica-
ble in all contexts. Rather, a priority should to generate country-
specific knowledge. This would of course have huge implications with 
regard to financial and bureaucratic resources. A practical proposal in 
this regard would be to rename and refocus the Working Group on 
Lessons Learned, and this should be coupled with an expansion of the 
relevant sections within the PBSO.  
Hybridity 
The first section of the paper also introduced two related suggestions 
as to how to address the insights from the liberal peace critique while 
at the same time not rejecting outside involvement in peacebuilding, 
nor the possibility that elements of the liberal peacebuilding model 
could be desirable in the recipient societies. Emphasising the com-
plexity – or hybridity – of post-conflict societies, arguments are in 
these approaches made for basing peacebuilding efforts on local vi-
sions of peace stemming from the meeting of external and internal 
normative agendas. It is suggested that the focus should be more on 
redistribution and social justice, rather than the building of ‘the hard 
shell of the state’.116 Consultations and negotiations with broad sec-
tions of the society are seen as an integral part of peacebuilding, so 
also the involvement of civil society actors in the building of a sus-
tainable peace.  
 
The implications of these arguments for the IPBS development pro-
cess are similar to those already listed above, that is, self-reflexivity 
with regard to the asymmetrical power relationship inherent in peace-
building, an emphasis on broad local participation and the prioritisa-
tion of the local perspective. One additional implication is that the 
main focus should not be on conflicts and threats, thus easily repro-
ducing the contemporary liberal peacebuilding agenda. Rather, it 
should be on visions of peace. Richmond’s recommendation in this 
regard deserves to be quoted in full:  
 
When internationals engage in conflict zones, one of the first questions they 
might ask of disputants at the many different levels of the polity might be 
what type of peace could be envisaged? Working towards such an explicit 
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end goal would be of great benefit to both internationals and recipients of in-
tervention.117  
 
He emphasises, however, that these visions must have their basis in 
the specific context in which peacebuilding occurs. 
 
Another implication is the emphasis on negotiations between the ex-
ternal and internal actors throughout the peacebuilding process and 
until there is agreement that a sustainable peace has been reached.118 
This might have radical implications for how the tracking and moni-
toring element of the IPBS is carried out. Since both the process and 
success criteria are up for continuous debate, there would be little 
room for generalised benchmarks, etc. This might be a bitter pill for 
donors to swallow. A third, and perhaps the most difficult implication, 
is the fact that the PBC would have to be prepared to accept locally-
based peacebuilding strategies that are not in line with what is consid-
ered to be desirable values and outcomes, nor ‘the proper way of do-
ing things’ at its headquarters in New York.  
 
 
 
Critical questions 
The implications of the insights from the liberal peace critique litera-
ture can also take the form of critical questions posed throughout the 
process of IPBS development as it is today. Christian Büger has sum-
marised the current IPBS process in a three-column table, detailing 
phase, technique, and structuring question.119 Drawing on the insights 
presented above, I would propose adding a set of critical questions to 
his table (the gray column): 
                                                 
117  Richmond, “The problem of peace”, 309. 
118  Richmond’s suggestion that interveners should be held accountable for sticking to their 
part of the deal is difficult to apply in this case, given that the PBC only has an advisory 
role.  
119  Büger, 23-24. 
Eli Stamnes 30 
 
Phase Technique Structuring Question Critical Questions 
Policy Dialogue (CSM) What does the country 
want? 
Who counts as ‘the coun-
try’? 
1) Needs assessment 
Mapping (PBSO) What is already in place? 
 
What is the frame of ref-
erence here – state capaci-
ties, civil society capaci-
ties? 
Policy Dialogue (CSM) 
Field Missions  
What is a critical issue? What is the frame of ref-
erence here? Threats to 
the liberal peace or other 
conceptualisations? 
2) Prioritisation 
Policy Dialogue (CSM) 
WGLL 
Is it a peacebuilding is-
sue? 
Should it be handled in 
the PBC? 
Who decides? 
What kind of knowledge 
is considered relevant? 
Policy Dialogue (CSM) 
Informal Consultation 
WGLL 
What can be done? What are local visions of 
peace and how to get 
there?  
3) Recommendations 
and Commitment 
Policy Dialogue 
Informal Consultation 
Compact Benchmarks 
Who can and will do 
what? 
Who counts as relevant 
actors? 
4) Monitoring and 
Tracking 
Research/Data gathering 
(PBSO) 
Field Missions (CSM) 
What is being 
done/implemented (re-
source flows? 
How are the priority is-
sues developing? 
(How is the security situa-
tion in the country devel-
oping?) 
Who decides? 
 
According to which stan-
dards? 
5) Policy Review Policy Dialogue on MTM 
Outcomes 
What needs to be revised? 
(3? 2? 1?) 
What are the underlying 
criteria? 
 
 
These critical questions are intended to increase self-reflexivity with 
regard to the values, conception of relevant knowledge and relevant 
actors, and the conception of problems/threats/peacebuilding that are 
underpinning the IPBS process. They represent thus one way of mak-
ing some of the insights presented above integral to the process. How-
ever, a more wholesale embrace of the liberal peace critique would 
mean that the processes in different countries would not easily be fit-
ted into a table intended to fit all. In this context – and as a concluding 
remark – it could be useful to remind ourselves of a lesson from post-
colonial theory: the practises of the interveners are also shaped by the 
recipients, by their challenge, resistance and exploitation. Hence, the 
future of the PBA and its IPBS practices is not only dependent upon 
the outcome of the 2010 review process. It depends to a large extent 
upon the members of the societies in which the PBC chooses to be-
come involved in the years to come.  
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